Production Uncertainty and Factor Price Disparity in the Slaughter Cattle Market: Theory and Evidence by Fausti, Scott & Feuz, Dillon
South Dakota State University
Open PRAIRIE: Open Public Research Access Institutional
Repository and Information Exchange
Department of Economics Staff Paper Series Economics
5-1-1994
Production Uncertainty and Factor Price Disparity
in the Slaughter Cattle Market: Theory and
Evidence
Scott Fausti
South Dakota State University
Dillon Feuz
South Dakota State University
Follow this and additional works at: http://openprairie.sdstate.edu/econ_staffpaper
Part of the Agricultural and Resource Economics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics at Open PRAIRIE: Open Public Research Access Institutional Repository and
Information Exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Department of Economics Staff Paper Series by an authorized administrator of Open
PRAIRIE: Open Public Research Access Institutional Repository and Information Exchange. For more information, please contact
michael.biondo@sdstate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Fausti, Scott and Feuz, Dillon, "Production Uncertainty and Factor Price Disparity in the Slaughter Cattle Market: Theory and
Evidence" (1994). Department of Economics Staff Paper Series. Paper 116.
http://openprairie.sdstate.edu/econ_staffpaper/116
PRODUCTION UNCERTAINTY AND FACTOR 
PRICE DISPARITY IN THE SLAUGHTER 
CATTLE MARKET: THEORY AND EVIDENCE1 
BY 
SCOTT FAUSTI AND DILLON FEUZ2 
Economics Staff Paper No. 94-9 
Papers in this series are reproduced and distributed to encourage discussion of 
research, extension, teaching, and economic policy issues. Although available 
to anyone on request, Economics Department Staff Papers are intended primarily 
for peers and policy makers. Papers are normally critiqued by some colleagues 
prior to publication in this series. However, they are not subject to formal 
review requirements of South Dakota State University's Agricultural Experiment 
Station and Cooperative Extension Service publications. 
1 The authors would like to thank Bill Adamson, Charles Kahn, Chuck 
Lamberton, Dale Menkhaus, Mike Seidel, and John Sondey for their comments. We 
take responsibility for any remaining errors. 
2 s. Fausti and D. Feuz are assistant professors in the Dept. of Economics, 
South Dakota State University. The authors would like to thank Dr. John Wagner 
and the Dept. of Animal Science at SDSU for access to the data used in the 
empirical section of this paper. 
Table of Contents 
Page 
Introduction............................................................ 1 
Assumptions and the Model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
The Effect of Uncertainty of Firm Behavior.............................. 6 
Market Separation and Price Disparity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 
Comparative Statics: A Decline in Uncertainty.......................... 10 
Empirical Findings: The Slaughter Cattle Market........................ 11 
Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 
Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 
Introduction: 
PRODUCTION UNCERTAINTY AND FACTOR PRICE DISPARITY 
IN THE SLAUGHTER CATTLE MARKET: THEORY AND EVIDENCE 
The theoretical analysis of competitive firm behavior under economic 
uncertainty has been explored in the areas of input and output price uncertainty 
in the papers by Baron (1970), Sandmo (1971), Batra and Ullah (1974), and Blair 
( 1974) among others. The issue of the competitive firm facing production 
uncertainty generated by input quality variability was addressed in a paper by 
Ratti and Ullah (1976). Other papers applied their approach to specific areas, 
such as, wage discrimination being explained by labor quality variability. 1 
A simple model of a competitive firm confronting production uncertainty, 
generated by the variability in the flow of factor service (input), is presented 
below. The authors believe that the assumptions of the model developed in this 
paper provides a realistic description of the short run behavior of firms engaged 
in meat packing operations in the upper midwest and purchasing cattle in the 
slaughter cattle market. 
This paper follows the approach used to analyze production uncertainty 
developed by Ratti and Ullah. The purpose of our study is to analyze firm 
behavior when it must purchase its input (steers) in an auction market under two 
different informational conditions. This in essence, creates two submarkets for 
the purchasing of the input. The firm has either complete information or 
incomplete information concerning the "contribution to production" of the input 
it is purchasing. 2 Incomplete information implies that there is uncertainty over 
the "contribution to production" of the input when purchased. The term 
"contribution to production", will be denoted CTP throughout the rest of the 
paper.3 
1 For example see the paper by Baldwin (1991). 
2 "Contribution to production", refers to that part of total product 
attributable to a particular input (slaughter cattle). 
3 The issue of uncertainty over the "contribution to production", is an 
issue of quantity and quality uncertainty. The yield of a carcass effects the 
total supply of the final output (beef), i.e., uncertainty over dressing 
percentage. The quality of an animal effects the quality of the final product 
1 
It is assumed that sellers of the input (cattle producers) have the choice 
of selling their product under either market alternative. It is further assumed 
that the firm (packer) is forced to compete in both markets when it purchases its 
input requirements. This is a reasonable assumption for firms operating in the 
meatpacking industry. If sellers choose method (A) to sell their product, then 
there is full information on the input's CTP when the firm makes its input 
purchase at the auction determined price. This is the profit maximization under 
certainty case for the firm. If sellers choose method (B) to sell their product, 
then there is uncertainty over the input's CTP when the firm makes its input 
purchase at the auction determined price.4 Thus, sellers are separating the 
market for their product into two distinct submarkets.5 
The model analyzes the firm's input purchasing decisions within this market 
structure. The theoretical results derived in the model are then empirically 
tested using data from the u.s. slaughter cattle market to determine if there is 
statistical evidence to support the conclusions of the model. 
In section 1, the model is presented. In section 2, the relationship 
between a firm's preference toward risk and production uncertainty is analyzed. 
In section 3, the issue of firm input pricing behavior across market alternatives 
is addressed. In section 4, the effect of a change in the variability of the 
input's contribution to production on firm input purchasing behavior is examined. 
In section s, the results derived in sections 3 and 4 are empirically tested. 
The theoretical analysis demonstrates that a risk neutral firm will pay 
less for an input with uncertainty over its CTP in a auction market, than for an 
input when its contribution is known with certainty. The implication of this 
(beef), i.e., uncertainty over the grade. 
4 Marketing method (A) represents the grade and yield method of marketing 
and method (B) is the live weight method of marketing. Ward (1987) provides a 
detailed description of these two marketing methods. 
5 It is assumed that cattle producers sell all of their herd in one market. 
They do not sell part of their herd in one market and the rest in the other 
market. 
2 
result is that firm purchasing behavior is generating price disparity. 6 As 
uncertainty over an input's contribution increases, the price paid for the input 
declines as compared to the certainty case. The implication of this result is 
that as uncertainty increases, the degree of price disparity increases. The 
empirical study in section 5 provides strong evidence that there does exist price 
differentials between the full information marketing method and incomplete 
information marketing method for slaughter cattle. 
I. Assumptions and the Model: 
The analysis assumes a short run time frame for the firm (packer). The firm 
operates in a competitive setting in both the output and factor markets.7 All 
inputs are assumed to be fixed except one. The one variable input X (one unit 
of cattle) must be purchased in an auction market, where sellers have the choice 
of selling their product via a full information marketing method (A) or an 
incomplete information marketing method (B).8 The firm is forced to compete in 
both markets and the information that is available concerning X's CTP when 
purchased in market (B) is assumed symmetric.9 It is assumed that the firm's 
purchasing decisions with respect to the two marketing methods are independent, 
and they are determined by demand and supply conditions in the output market. 
Once the firm has purchased the slaughter cattle, X, via method (A) or (B), X's 
CTP becomes known to the firm. Hence, the method employed to purchase X has no 
effect on the production process. Therefore, it is assumed that the price paid 
for cattle by the firm is based on profit maximization criteria and is dependent 
6 Price disparity, unlike price discrimination, is not generated by market 
failure, e.g., the packer does not exert monopsony power. 
7 The authors recognize that the number of firms engaged in the meatpacking 
industry do not meet the criteria for a perfectly competitive market. However, 
our paper will show that price discrimination can occur in the absence of market 
power, and if there is market power present then it would most likely affect the 
mean level of prices being paid in the market and not alter the price 
differentials found in the submarketa. 
8 one unit of cattle refers to per head, per pen, etc. 
9 We are assuming that the slaughter cattle market does not have an 
asymmetric information problem. 
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on how they purchase X. However, the pricing decision arrived at for method (A) 
is independent of the pricing decision arrived at for method (B). 10 This type 
of market environment generates a firm pricing strategy that produces price 
disparity. This set of assumptions, in the authors' opinion, provides a 
realistic description of the slaughter cattle market in the United States. 11 
Assume a short run production process that uses only one variable input X, 
slaughter cattle. Define X as unit of slaughter cattle acquired for current use 
in the production of beef products. If slaughter cattle are purchased in market 
(A), then the firm knows the amount of output that can be generated by input X. 12 
If slaughter cattle are purchased in market (B), then X1 represents the unit of 
slaughter cattle available for the production of beef. Given that actual quality 
of slaughter cattle is not known if purchased in market (B), its CTP is uncertain 
at the time of purchase. In order for the firm to maximize total profit the 
ratio of the marginal physical products (MPP) of X to X1 must be equal to the 
ratio of the prices paid for X and X1 • 
Following the modeling procedure developed by Ratti and Ullah, X and X1 are 
linked in the following way: 
X1 :: vX (1) 
where v is a strictly positive random variable with the variable's density 
function defined as f (v) with a unit mean. 13 
10 Independence is only assumed for individual lots of cattle purchased via 
method (A) or (B) and not for the mean price level found in the two markets. That 
is, the mean price level in both submarkets are dependent on the output price. 
1 1 Feuz, Fausti, and Wagner (1993), discuss the structure of the slaughter 
cattle market and provide empirical evidence that average profits to cattle 
feeders vary among marketing methods. 
12 Cattle are not homogenous inputs, however, their 
contribution to production is known with certainty when they are 
purchased via the G&Y market. 
13 In the following analysis, the model developed in this paper is a 
modified version of the model developed by Ratti and Ullah. Ratti and Ullah give 
credit to Walters (1960), and Rooclman (1972) for the method of specification of 
the input variables. In this paper, as in the paper by Ratti and Ullah, the issue 
is uncertainty over the flow of factor services to production. 
4 
The firm's short run production function when it purchases in market A or 
B is defined as, 
Q = h (X1 ) = h (vX), h' (Xi ) > 0, h" (Xi ) < O. (2) 
The third derivative of the production function is assumed to exist, and the 
marginal product of the input is positive but declining. The marginal product 
of the input is the first derivative of the input's CTP. 
If X is purchased in market (A), then v is assumed to be a constant, with 
a value of one. If X is purchased in market (B), then v is defined as a random 
variable, which implies output (Q) is also a random variable. The random 
variable v is assumed to be positive with the variable• s density function defined 
as f (v), and the expected value of v is defined as E(v] = 1. Given the nature 
of the live market (market B) for slaughter cattle, it is reasonable to assume 
that on average firms are correct about the quality of the cattle purchased. 
Thus, the unit mean assumption imposed on v is reasonable.14 
Beginning with firm behavior under certainty (market A), it is assumed the 
firm's goal is to maximize profits Il· The variables p, r, and C are defined 
respectively as the output price of beef and the input price of slaughter cattle 
and the fixed cost. The firm's profit function is defined as 
TI= p•h (X) - r·X - C. 
(3) 
The first order condition for profit maximization is 
dil/dX = p•h' (X) - r = O. (4) 
The second order condition for profit maximization is 
d2Il/dX2 = p•h" (X) < 0. (5) 
Rearranging the equation 4, the following equilibrium condition is arrived at 
p•h' (X) = r or p = r/h'(X). (6) 
Equilibrium condition (6) is the standard result. The firm will purchase the 
input for a price equal to its marginal value product (MVP), i.e., the value of 
its marginal contribution to the production of beef. 
14 Cattle buyers make a living purchasing cattle in the live market. 
Therefore, one would not expect systematic errors in their bidding over time. 
5 
If firms purchase a unit of cattle in market (B), then there is uncertainty 
over the CTP of that unit purchased. In other words, the CTP of the unit 
purchased becomes a random variable. Profit is now defined in terms of expected 
utility. Assuming that the firm's utility function conforms to characteristics 
of a Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function and its third derivative exists, 
the firm's expected utility from profit can be written as 
E[U (II)J = E(U (p•h (Xi ) - r•X - C)] . ( 7) 
It is assumed that the marginal utility of profit is positive U' (II) > O, 
and the value of U' (II) being negative if the firm is risk averse, 0 if the firm 
is risk neutral, and positive if the firm is risk preferring. 
The first order condition for maximizing expected utility of profit is 
dE [ u <II) ) / dX = E ( u' (II) • ( p • v • h' ( Xi ) - r) ) = 0. 
The second order condition is 
d2E[U (II)J/dX2 = E(U' (II)• (p•v•h' (Xi ) - r)
2 + 
p•v2•h' (Xi) •U' <II>) < O. (9) 
II. The Effect of Uncertainty on Firm Behavior: 
(8) 
The issue in this section is, how uncertainty over the input's CTP, in 
conjunction with the firm's attitude toward risk, affect the rate of return paid 
to the cattle producer by the firm (packer). The analysis begins with rewriting 
equation (8) in the following manner 
E[U' (II)•(p•v•h' (Xi ))) = E[U' (II)J•r. (10) 
Adopting Horowitz's (1970) alternative way of expressing equation (10), 
p•E(v•h' (Xi )] = r - {p•Cov (U' , v·h' (Xi )) / E[U' <II>] }. (11) 
From above it is clear that the MPP and MVP of slaughter cattle are now 
random variables given by v•h' (Xi ) and p•v•h' (Xi) respectively. Examining the 
covariance term in equation (11), it is clear that when u• <II> = O, the covariance 
term is also equal to zero. The implication of equation (11) is that the risk 
neutral firm purchases cattle in the live market for r = E[MVP). However, when 
U' (II) � O, the sign of the covariance term can not be ascertained. However, it 
can be demonstrated that when it is assumed that the elasticity of the marginal 
6 
product curve of the input has an absolute value of less than one, then sign Cov 
= sign u• <II> : 
I'= dh' (Xi )/dX1 • Xtfh'(Xi ) = X1•h' (Xi )/h' (Xi ) > -1. (12) 
If equation (12) is true, then examining the derivatives of the two components 
of the covariance term with respect to v, 
d [ v • h ' ( Xi ) ] / dv = h ' ( X1 ) • [ 1 + I) > 0, (13) 
and 
dU' (fl)/dv = U* (I1)•p•X•h' (Xi ), (14) 
verifies that sign Cov = sign u•cII>· That is, since the sign of equation (14) 
is dependent on u•cII>, and equation (13 ) is positive, sign Cov must equal sign 
u·cII>· 
Applying this result to equation (11), the following condition is arrived 
at 
p • E ( v • h' ( Xi ) ] Z r, (15) 
depending on whether u• <TI> t O. 
The above result can be interpreted as follows; at the margin: 1) the risk 
neutral firm will purchase a unit of cattle at a price equal to its E[MVP] in the 
live market; 2) the risk averse firm will purchase a unit of cattle at a price 
less than its E[MVP] in the live market; and 3 )  the risk preferring firm will 
purchase a unit of cattle at a price greater than its E[MVP] in the live market. 
The implications of these results are that firm's input demand for X is dependent 
on its attitude toward risk. 15 
III, Market Separation and Price Disparity: 
In this section the analysis will begin with the assumption that the firm 
is risk neutral. As stated above, sellers of slaughter cattle choose one of two 
methods to sell their cattle and firms purchase cattle under both systems. This 
market structure implies that there are actually two submarkets for slaughter 
cattle. This paper assumes that the firm's purchasing decisions in each market 
15 These results are consistent with the results derived in the paper by 
Ratti and Ullah. 
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are made independently because of the informational disparities between the two 
submarkets with respect to the input's CTP. It follows that, independent profit 
maximization decisions with respect to purchases of X are made for each 
submarket. The implication is that the meat packing firm will maximize profit by 
setting MVP=MC in each market. Rearranging equations ( 6) and ( 11), yields 
equations 16 and 17 respectively; 
p = r/h' (X), 
and 
p = [r - {p•Cov (U',v•h'(X1)) /E[U' (Il) ]}) / E[v•h'(Xi) ]. 
To simplify the analysis, replace r in equation (17) with * r • 
(16) 
(17) 
Given that output 
price p is the same regardless of the input market the firm purchases in, the 
following equilibrium condition is derived from equations (16) and (17) , 
r/h' (X) = (r* - {p•Cov(U',v•h' (Xi) )/E[U' (Il) l}l / E[v•h'(Xi) ]. (18) 
Equation (18) leads to the first proposition in the paper: 
PROPOSITION I. If a risk neutral firm purchases its inputs from two 
(seller separated) submarkets, where the two subgroups have equal average 
productivity and differ only in the amount of information available on an input's 
CTP, then the firm will purchase the input from the group with the uncertainty 
over its CTP at a lower price than from the group where the CTP is known with 
perfect information. 
To establish the above proposition, it is assumed that the third derivative 
of the production function is negative. This implies that the marginal product 
function h' (Xi) is itself a concave function. This assumption is consistent with 
equation (12) , and implies that dl'/dX1 < O. The implications of h• (Xi) <0 is that 
the MPP of X1 is a non-increasing function of X1 •16 Under the assumption that 
h• (Xd <O, and employing Jensen's inequality the following result is attained, 
E[h'(vX)] < h' (X) .17 (19) 
16 As noted by Ratti and Ullah, this assumption is consistent 
with many of the common forms of production functions used in 
economic analysis. For example, the Cobb-Douglas and CES production 
functions have this property. 
17 The Jensen inequality states that if a function is concave the following 
is true: E[h (X) ] < h[E (X)]. The implication for our model is that the MPP of X 
in an uncertain environment is less than the MPP of X if production had taken 
place with the expected value of the random variable X, i.e., a certain 
environment. See Rao (1973, p.58) for an explanation of Jensen's inequality. 
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Equation (19) implies that the risk neutral firm's expected MPP generated 
by X1 is less than the MPP that would be achieved under conditions of certainty 
given the same factor combination. Certainty implies a situation where the 
random variable v is replaced by its expected value. Applying the result derived 
in equation (19} to equation (18) implies that for the risk neutral firm, r must 
be greater than r*. This establishes proposition I. 
Proposition I demonstrates that a perfectly competitive firm facing a 
competitive but segregated market structure for factor inputs, and the two 
submarkets varying only on the information available on the input's CTP, will 
engage in a pricing strategy that generates price disparity. That is, although 
all cattle are paid their expected marginal value product. However, firms in a 
sense are discriminating between the two groups because they have equal average 
productivity, but sellers receive unequal average returns for their cattle. This 
proposition presents an interesting case of a firm's pricing strategy producing 
a form of price discrimination (disparity} in its factor market without market 
power. 
If it is assumed that the firm is risk averse, then equation ( 18) 
demonstrates that the degree of price disparity will increase. This last 
statement leads to the second proposition of the paper; 
PROPOSITION II. The degree of price disparity that is generated between 
market alternatives will vary positively with the degree of firm risk aversion. 
To established proposition II, proposition I is reasserted. Proposition I 
established that r is greater than r* for the risk neutral firm. Then by 
equations (15 & 18), r* must be greater than say any r-, the price that a risk 
averse firm would pay for a unit of cattle in the live market. Thus, 
proposition II is established. 
Note: risk neutrality implies that the covariance terms in equations 17 & 18 are 
zero. 
9 
IV. Comparative statics: A Decline In Uncertainty: 
In this section the effect of an change in the amount of information 
available to the firm on the CTP of a unit of cattle purchased in market (B) is 
examined. A change in the amount of information available implies a change in 
the amount of uncertainty associated with X marketed via marketing method (B). 
To capture this effect of a marginal change in uncertainty, the distribution of 
v will under-go a mean preserving change in the dispersion of the distribution. 
The results developed below are only determinant in the risk neutral case. A 
modification of equation (8) is now undertaken by replacing v with v*= (a•v + B), 
where a is a shift parameter and B is a function of a with the following 
properties: 
1) B' = -E[v) = -1, and 2) B (a=l) = O. This transformation implies that X1 = 
(a•v + B)•X. Assuming the firm is risk neutral equation (8) is now 
dE [ II J / dX = E [ p • v* • h' ( Xi ) - r] = 0. ( 2 0) 
Replacing v* with (a•v + B), and renaming equation (20) E(Z], 
E[Z] = E(p• (a•v + B) •h' (X1) - r] = 0, (2 1) 
the comparative static analysis can begin. Invoking the implicit function 
theorem around the equilibrium value of X and a=l, then taking the total 
differential of E(Z] and setting all of the differentials to zero except dX and 
da, the partial derivative ax;aa is derived 
ax;aa = -E[{p• (v-l)•h' (Xi)• (l +I)}/ {p•v"'2•h" (Xi )}]. (22) 
The sign of the partial derivative derived above can be determined by examining 
the following relationship: 
p • E [ ( v-1 ) • h ' ( Xi ) • ( 1 + I) ) = Cov ( ( v-1) , h' ( Xi ) • ( 1 + I) ) • ( 2 3 ) 
By ascertaining the sign of Cov ( (v-1), h' (Xi)• (1 + I)) ,  the sign of the numerator 
of equation (23) can be determined. Examining the derivatives of the two 
components of the covariance term with respect to v, 
d[h' (Xi)• (l+I') )/dv < O, (24) 
and 
d (v-1)/dv = 1 > O, (25 ) 
10 
verifies that the sign of the covariance is negative and thus the sign of the 
partial derivative ax;aa < o. 
The above result leads to the third proposition of the paper: 
PROPOSITION III. For risk neutral firms, as uncertainty over CTP declines, 
the degree of price disparity between marketing alternatives will decline. 
To establish the above proposition the implications of ax;aa being negative 
are analyzed. The negative sign indicates that as the uncertainty over CTP 
declines, demand for cattle via marketing method (B) increases. The implication 
is that for a fixed unit amount of cattle purchased, a decrease in uncertainty 
increases the expected MPP of a unit of cattle. This means that E(v•h' (Xi)] < 
E[v*•h' (Xi)] when a <  1. Examining this result in the context of equation (18), 
an increase in the expected MPP of a unit of cattle purchased via marketing 
method (B) will increase r* relative to r. Thus, the degree of price disparity 
declines as uncertainty declines and thus proposition III is established. 
v. Empirical Findings: The Slaughter cattle Market. 
In this section two hypothesis tests are constructed to test if there is 
evidence to support propositions I and III. The data for the empirical analysis 
were collected from the South Dakota Retained Ownership Demonstration Proiect. 18 
Over a three year period beginning in April of 1991 218 pens of cattle were 
marketed via the grade and yield marketing method. 19 Market price data for the 
live and dressed weight markets were collected for the same type of cattle in the 
same marketing area�. This enabled us to construct average revenue per pen for 
18 The Dept. of Animal and Range Science at South Dakota State 
University is administering the project. A description of the 
project can be found in Wagner, et al. {1991, 1992 and 1993). 
19 Marketing cattle in pens is a common practice in this market. Each pen 
in the demonstration project contained five steers. 
� Hartman indicated the cattle from the project were representative of the 
cattle being purchased in the general market area. The Nebraska Direct Dressed 
and Live weight market prices were obtained from Data Transmission Network and 
the USDA, Livestock and Wool statistics, and were then adjusted down for the 
local basis by $1/cwt and $0.6 4/cwt for dressed and live weight, respectively. 
11 
the cattle in the project for all three markets. Thus, it is possible to make 
a comparison of average revenue received per head for each pen of cattle in the 
project under three different marketing methods; 1) live weight, 2) dressed 
weight, and 3) grade and yield. 21 This unique data set allowed the following 
empirical testing procedures to be used to test if there is a difference in 
average revenue paid for a particular pen of cattle across the three marketing 
methods. The empirical testing of proposition I below will employ the "Difference 
between Population Means: Matched Pairs Test".� 
To test proposition I, the null hypothesis is, average revenue per pen paid 
to sellers in the live and grade & yield marketing methods are equal. Against 
the alternative that average revenue per pen paid is higher in the grade & yield 
marketing method. 
Ho: ux - u>' = a 
Hl: ux - u)' > a 
HYPOTHESES TEST I 
Decision rule: reject Ho if the following is true 
a I < s11/n'" > > t,..1,.., 
where 6 = l: (xi-Yi) /n and s11 = [l/ (n-l)• {l:u? - nu2}] 
ux is the population mean value of revenue paid per pen in the grade & 
yield marketing method. U>' is the population mean value of the revenue paid per 
pen in the live marketing method. The variable xi is the average revenue paid for 
the i� pen in the grade & yield market. The variable y1 is the average revenue 
paid for the i� pen in the live market. The variable s0 is the observed sample 
standard deviation for the n differences: ui = (xcy1 ). 
If the null hypothesis is rejected, it can be concluded that there is 
evidence to suggest that average revenue paid per pen in the grade & yield market 
21 Average revenue per pen implies that the total revenue per pen received 
is divided by the number of cattle in that pen. 
� A description of the "Difference between Population Means: Matched Pairs 
Test" can be found in Newbold (1991, pp. 377-80). The robustness of the test is 
dependent on the distribution of the differences following a normal distribution. 
The Bowman/Shelton test for normality was conducted and a test statistic of • 9314 
was derived. This result strongly supports the assumption that the distribution 
of differences is normal for the data used to test proposition I. A description 
of the normality test can be found in Newbold (1991, pp. 442-44). 
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is higher than in the live market. The results of the hypothesis test produced 
a mean difference of average revenue per pen paid of $9. 22, and a t  statistic of 
5. 33. The null hypothesis is rejected with a p-value of . 0001. The conclusion is 
that there is strong evidence in favor of proposition I, which implies that there 
is a price differential between the two marketing systems. 
An increase in information on an input's contribution to production implies 
a decrease in uncertainty. The dressed weight marketing method represents an 
intermediate marketing method between live and grade & yield with respect to the 
amount of information available to buyers in the slaughter cattle market. The 
testing procedure used above is not the appropriate testing procedure because the 
distribution of the differences between live and dressed weight is not normal. D 
To test proposition III, the null hypothesis becomes, the distribution of 
differences for revenue per pen paid to sellers in the live and dressed weight 
marketing methods is centered on zero. Against the alternative that the center 
of the distribution is greater than zero. 
HYPOTHESIS TEST II  
Ho: Distribution is centered on zero 
Hl: Center of distribution is greater than zero 
Decision rule: reject Ho if the following is tru 
(T-µT) /aT < -z,,, 
where T is the observed value of the Wilcoxon statistic 
and µT, aT are the E (T) and Var (T) respectively. 
If the null hypothesis is rejected, it can be concluded that there is 
evidence to suggest that average revenue paid per pen in the dressed weight 
market is higher than in the live market. The implication of a rejection of the 
null hypothesis is that price disparity declines as uncertainty declines. 
The mean difference of average revenue per pen paid for dressed weight 
minus live weight is $6. 74, and a z test statistic derived from the Wilcoxon test 
is -2. 3655.  The null hypothesis is clearly rejected with a p-value of .01. The 
D The Bowman-Shelton test statistic derived from this data is 10. 51. The 
assumption that the distribution of the differences is normal is rejected with 
a p-value of less than .OS. Therefore, the non-parametric Wilcoxon Test (large 
sample), will be employed to test if there is evidence to support proposition 
III. A description of the Wilcoxon test can be found in Newbold (1991, pp. 419-
423). 
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conclusion is that there is strong evidence in favor of proposition III, which 
implies that the price differential (disparity) between the two marketing systems 
declines as uncertainty declines. 
VI. SUMMARY: 
A short run model of a competitive firm facing uncertainty over a factor's 
CTP was presented in this paper. The assumptions of the model reflect, in the 
authors• opinion, a realistic characterization of the U.S. slaughter cattle 
market. The paper provides a theoretical explanation and empirical evidence of 
packer purchasing behavior, in the absence of market failure, generating price 
disparity, . 
Under the assumptions of the model, it was demonstrated first that a 
competitive, risk neutral firm will engage in a pricing strategy that will 
produce price disparity when it purchases a single input in two submarkets which 
differ only in the amount of information available on the CTP of the single 
factor. Next, it was shown that the degree of price disparity is positively 
related to the degree of firm risk aversion. The final theoretical result 
established that the degree of price disparity is inversely related to the amount 
of information available on an input's CTP. 
The empirical section of the paper provides strong support for the 
existence of factor price disparity due to uncertainty over an input• s CTP. 
Evidence also was provided in support of an inverse relationship between the 
degree of price disparity and the amount of information available on a factor's 
CTP. 
The findings presented in this paper raise new questions on how uncertainty 
affects competitive factor markets. A natural extension of this research is to 
relax the assumption of competitive factor markets. Another possible extension 
would be to relax the assumption of symmetric information. 
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FACTOR QUALITY UNCERTAINTY, FACTOR PRICE DISCRIMINATION 
AND THE COMPETITIVE FIRM: THEORY AND EVIDENCE 
E(). 8: 
E() 9: 
MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX 
E(), 8: dE[U(Il)] _ ,;{ dU(Il) 
dx - -l dll 
dU(Il) an u' CII> 
v 
dll = P • v · h' (x1) - r dx 
�] 
dE[U(Il)] = E [U' (II) · (P • v · h' (x1) - r)] dx 
d2 E[UCII> l = J d2 uclI) 
dx2 ""l dll2 
dlI 
dx 
d U(IT) 
] dll 
In the paper EQ. 9 is derived in the same manner as EQ. 8. EQ. 9 in the 
paper can be derived following the mathematical expression given above. 
EQ. 10: EQ(lO) is just EQ (8) rearranged. 
EQ. 11: Horowitz, p. 364-367 uses the following definition E(xy) = E(y) 
• E(x) + COV(x,y). Thus the left hand side of EQ. 10 is equalivant to 
E{U' <II>] • E [P • v • h' (xi)] + COV[U' <II>, v • h' (x i)] replacing the LHS with 
this equalivant expression and solving for E[P • v • h'(x i)] gives us EQ. 11. 
16 
EQ. 12: Equation (12) gives the standard procedure for deriving an 
elasticity coefficient. 
EQ, 13: 
db' (x1) ----=- = b'1 (x1) • x dv 
= h • (X1 ) ' [ 1 + I] ) 0 
EQ, 14: du'(IT) = 
dv 
du' (Il) 
dll 
dll 
du' (Il) = u'' <Il> 
dll 
'::;: where dII = p • b' (x1) A '::; : x 
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EQ 14: du' (Il) 
dv 
Given that P, X, h' (x i) are all positive, the sign of EQ (14) is the 
same as the sign of U'' (Il)· 
EQ. 15: Eq. (15 ) is expressing the implications coming from EQs. 12 - 14 on 
EQ. 11. 
Equations 16 - 18 should be clear. 
After proposition I, it is stated that if h''' (xi) < 0, then di'/dx 1 < 0. 
X1 • h" (X1} 
di' = d ......__
h_' _(X-'1'-)_..,. 
dxl dxl 
= h' (x1 ) [h'' (x1 ) + h'" (x1 ) • x1] - [h'' (x1 ) • X1 • h'' (x1 )] 
h' (x1) • h' (x1) 
(+) (-) 
h"' (x1) • X1 
h' (x1 ) 
+ 
Thus h"' (x1 ) < 0 assures that 
di' < O. 
dxl 
EQ. 20. The first order condition is rewritten to incorporate v* and 
the assumption of a risk neutral firm. 
20. dE(II) = E[p • v• · h'(x1) - r] = O 
dx 
Eq. 21 replaces v* with (a•v + B) and rename the FOC: E[Z] . 
21. E[z] = E[p • (u • V+ J}) ·h'(x1) - r] = O 
EQ. 22 is the result of comparative static analysis. Taking the total 
differential of E[z] and setting all differentials to zero except dx, da, and 
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remembering that dv*/da = ( v-1 ) , we have , 
dE [ z ] = E [ P • [ v" ]
2 
• h" ( x i ) ]  dx + E [ P • v • h' ( xi ) - P • h' ( xi ) + P • h • ( x i ) • ( a  
· v + B ) • x · ( v - 1 ) ] da 
Now the above equation reduces to : 
dE [ z] = E [P · ( V* ) 2 • h" (x1 ) ]  dx + E [P · ( v  - 1 )  · h' (x1 ) • ( 1  + g'j ] da. 
Setting dE [ z ] to zero al lows ax/a« to be derived . 
EQ. 22 . ax = 
_ 
[ 
P • E [ ( V - 1 ) • h' ( X1 ) • ( 1  + � ] 
] 
< 
O 
aa P · E [ c v· ) 2 • h" ( x1 > J 
NOTE : When doing the comparative statics one must remember that 
X 1 = ( a • v  + B ) • X so that 
dxl 
da 
( v  - 1 )  • X 
The sign of equation 2 2  is dependent on the numerator , since the 
denominator is negative and the entire expression has a negative sign . The 
key to signing the numerator is the following relationship : 
E (x · y) = E ( x) · E ( y) + Cov (x, y) thus 
EQ . 23 . E [ ( v - 1 ) · h' ( x1 ) • ( 1 + g'J ] = E [ ( v - 1 )  ] · E [h' ( x1 ) • ( 1 + g'J ] + 
+ Cov [ ( v  - 1 ) , h' ( x1 ) ( 1  + g'J ] , but = E [  ( v  - 1 ) ]  = 0 .  So we have EQ . 23 . 
2 3 . E [ ( v - 1 )  · h' (x1 ) • ( 1  + g'J ]  = CoV[ ( v - 1 ) , h' (x1 ) • ( 1  + g'J ]  
EQ. 24 . 
d [h' ( X1 ) • ( 1 + � ]  
dv 
d [h' ( x1 ) + X1 • h" ( x1 ) ]  
dv 
d [h' ( x1 ) ( 1 + Zl ]  
dv 
= h" (x1 ) • a. · X + a. · X • h" (x1 ) + X1 • h"' (x1 ) • a. · X 
19  
d [h' (x1 ) • ( 1  + gj ]  given tha t h" , h'" are nega ti ve ,  then 
dv 
< O 
EO. 25 . d ( v  - 1 )  
dv 
1 > 0 
Thus equations 24  and 2 5  have opposite signs,  so the covariance is 
negat ive , which means ox/oa. < 0 : . • 
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PRODUCTION UNCERTAINTY AND FACTOR PRICE DISPARITY 
IN THE SLAUGHTER CATTLE MARKET : THEORY AND EVIDENCE 
Data Appendix 
Detailed data were col lected on 69 pens of steer calves in 
19 9 1 ,  84 pens of steer calves in 1992  and 65 pens of steer calves 
in 1993  as part of a retained ownership demonstration proj ect . The 
summary statistics for variables of interest to this paper are 
included in Appendix Table Al . 
These steers were marketed on a grade and yield basis in the 
spring of the year when three out of the five steers were estimated 
to be at 0 . 4  inches of fat over the 12th rib . The Choice market 
price and discounts for Select carcasses , Yield grade 4 carcasses 
( $ 10-12 / cwt ) , carcasses over 950  pounds ( $ 10/cwt ) , or carcasses 
under 550 pounds ( $ 12 / cwt ) were negotiated with a commercial cattle 
buyer in a competitive market . The average l ive and dressed weight 
market prices for similar types of steers were obtained from market 
quotes and revenue per head was calculated as if the steers had 
been sold under all  three marketing methods {Appendix Table Al ) . 
The data are most representative of the upper midwest/western 
corn belt region of the U . S .  The data also are l imited to the 
March through June marketing time frame . The empirical results 
generated are thought to be representative of this marketing area 
and time frame . However , additional research is needed to 
determine if  simi lar results would occur in other marketing areas 
and time frames . 
2 1  
Appendix Table Al . Summary Statistics on 2 18 pens of Slaughter 
Steers used for the Empirical Analysis of this Paper . 
Variable 
Live Slaughter Weight 
Hot Carcass Weight 
Dressing Percentage 
Yield Grade 
Percentage Choice Grade 
Calculated Revenue 
Live Weight 
Dressed Weight 
Grade & Yield 
Units 
Pounds 
Pounds 
Percent 
1 - 5 
Percent 
$ /head 
$/head 
$/head 
22  
Mean 
114 6 . 15 90.8936 
7 3 0 . 8 4 62.8868 
6 3 . 7 4 1.3883 
2 . 3 5 0.4457 
0 . 4 5 0.2.867 
895 . 2 5 70.8636 
9 0 1 . 9 9  79.3132 
9 04 . 4 7 81.5949 
